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Inferring Unseen Causes:
Developmental and Evolutionary
Origins
Zeynep Civelek* , Josep Call and Amanda M. Seed
School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom
Human adults can infer unseen causes because they represent the events around
them in terms of their underlying causal mechanisms. It has been argued that young
preschoolers can also make causal inferences from an early age, but whether or
not non-human apes can go beyond associative learning when exploiting causality is
controversial. However, much of the developmental research to date has focused on
fully-perceivable causal relations or highlighted the existence of a causal relationship
verbally and these were found to scaffold young children’s abilities. We examined
inferences about unseen causes in children and chimpanzees in the absence of linguistic
cues. Children (N = 129, aged 3–6 years) and zoo-living chimpanzees (N = 11, aged 7–
41 years) were presented with an event in which a reward was dropped through an
opaque forked-tube into one of two cups. An auditory cue signaled which of the cups
contained the reward. In the causal condition, the cue followed the dropping event,
making it plausible that the sound was caused by the reward falling into the cup; and
in the arbitrary condition, the cue preceded the dropping event, making the relation
arbitrary. By 4-years of age, children performed better in the causal condition than the
arbitrary one, suggesting that they engaged in reasoning. A follow-up experiment ruled
out a simpler associative learning explanation. Chimpanzees and 3-year-olds performed
at chance in both conditions. These groups’ performance did not improve in a simplified
version of the task involving shaken boxes; however, the use of causal language helped
3-year-olds. The failure of chimpanzees could reflect limitations in reasoning about
unseen causes or a more general difficulty with auditory discrimination learning.
Keywords: causal reasoning, hidden causes, temporal order, pre-schoolers, chimpanzees
INTRODUCTION
In life and also in science, much of the evidence we get for causal relations is indirect. We can
infer the existence and nature of a cause for an event despite not witnessing it directly: if it is
hidden from our perspective, or if it is not perceivable by the senses. Our inferences can range
from identifying the cause of a crashing sound coming from the kitchen (the wooden cutting board
or the metal pot falling on the floor) to the causes of global warming (anthropogenic impact on the
greenhouse effect). But how do we do this? Bullock et al. (1982) suggest that we use the principles of
determinism, priority and mechanism: We assume that there is a causal structure to the world (i.e.,
that events typically have causes); that these structures are unidirectional (i.e., causes come before
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their effects) and that events are underpinned by a causal
mechanism of some kind. Using these principles, and our prior
knowledge with regards to specific relations, we can work our way
from effects to detect likely causes. This is an extraordinary ability
that frees us from relying on what can be directly perceived,
allows us to make predictions about the future, and intervene to
bring about desirable outcomes.
However, we can also learn regular covariations in
spatiotemporal contiguity, which allow us to exploit a causal
pattern even if we do not theorize about the generative
mechanism (Shanks and Dickinson, 1987). If two events occur
repeatedly under close spatiotemporal proximity, we form
associative links between them. Later when one of the cues occur,
the other can be predicted without any reference to the causal
mechanism involved, indeed, without any explicit awareness
of the relationship at all (Reber, 1989). Conversely, we can
learn a great deal about unseen causal relations without any
direct experience: from others’ explicit testimony or implicit
linguistic cues to causality (Harris and Koenig, 2006; Gelman,
2009). We may even learn about causal relations we may not
have learnt otherwise (e.g., “The gravitational attraction of the
moon causes tides”). These three alternative routes to exploiting
causal relations in the world (association, theory-building and
testimony) are not mutually exclusive, as adults we make us of all
of them, and they interact in important ways.
What are the origins of these abilities in human development
and over human evolution? There is good evidence that statistical
or associative learning is present early in infancy (Aslin et al.,
1998; Kirkham et al., 2002), and that this ability is shared
with a great many other species. It is similarly uncontroversial
that learning from testimony is a route available to children
once they learn language, and unique to our species. However,
when it comes to going beyond the data to reason about causal
mechanisms there is more controversy both in developmental
and comparative psychology (Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Bonawitz
et al., 2010; Seed et al., 2011). Some researchers have suggested
that humans have a natural tendency to explain the events they
observe in terms of causal theories from very early in life (Bullock
et al., 1982; Gopnik and Wellman, 2012). If this is the case, it
is plausible that we share this ability with our closest primate
relatives, and possibly other species (Seed et al., 2011; Völter and
Call, 2017). Alternatively, others contend that causal thinking in
early childhood might not be well-characterized by the notion of
“theories all the way down” (Carey and Spelke, 1996). Instead
children’s thinking about causation may only approximate
scientific thinking later in development, due in part to input from
others with the development of language. If this is the case, we
may not expect to find causal reasoning in non-human primates.
Penn and Povinelli (2007) have argued that there is no evidence
non-human animals represent causality as such.
While tackling these questions empirically, one issue common
to the comparative and developmental literature concerns
distinguishing causal reasoning (based on representations
of causal mechanism) from associative learning (making
predictions in the absence of these representations), since events
that are causally linked tend to co-occur. From a developmental
perspective alone, a second issue concerns teasing apart the
role of causal language and reasoning since children can use
both to solve causal problems. We have two aims in this
paper: (1) to further explore children’s inferences about unseen
causes in the absence of linguistic cues to causality, and (2)
to use the same paradigm to explore this ability in our closest
relatives, chimpanzees.
There is substantial research suggesting that preschool
children take unseen causal relations into account when
explaining natural phenomena such as light (Bullock et al., 1982),
wind (Shultz, 1982), electricity (Buchanan and Sobel, 2011), and
contamination by germs (Legare et al., 2009). However, it is
difficult to isolate the route to causal knowledge in cases that
involve familiar events such as these. Children may have extensive
prior experience with lights and blowing candles which may lead
to forming associative links or may have been explicitly taught
by adults about how “germs cause disease.” Indeed, younger
preschoolers who supposedly did not have extensive experience
with wires and electricity, failed to reason about these relations
and made decisions based on covariation information instead
(Buchanan and Sobel, 2011). They were only able to solve the
problem when it involved more familiar batteries. Although it
is possible that experience leads to extracting abstract causal
information, it may also lead to learning arbitrary associations
(e.g., when there are batteries inside, the toy works).
A way to address this issue has been to present preschoolers
with novel and arbitrary causal structures. As adults and
scientists, when the evidence we get does not fit with our
prior knowledge or expectations, we infer unseen causes or
confounding variables. In order to test if children reasoned in
the same way, children were first trained on a novel causal
structure (e.g., puppets moving in a certain way), and then saw
evidence that was inconsistent with their training (Gopnik et al.,
2004; Schulz and Sommerville, 2006; Schulz et al., 2008). When
children were asked to make predictions about the cause of
this inconsistent event, they were more likely to say that an
unseen cause (i.e., “something else”) was responsible. Children
also displayed an ability to imagine the effect of a hidden cause in
a series of experiments by Siegel et al. (2014). They were able to
select boxes to shake that would yield unambiguous data (e.g.,
if their task was to locate a hard object, they chose to pair it
with a soft object rather than another hard object). However, in
these studies the existence of a cause and the possibility that it
might be unseen was provided in the framing of the task by the
experimenter so the children did not have to infer it from the
evidence alone. For instance, the experimenter asked “Why are
the puppets moving together? Is it X, Y or something else?”
Overall, the evidence suggests that by 4 years of age children
can successfully detect the presence of an unseen cause and make
inferences about their nature; but the potential impact of others’
verbal testimony on their abilities has not been explored to date.
Gelman (2009) argued that children are not “lone scientists”:
they get much needed input from adults around them. Linguistic
framing can help children to specify a causal relation by testifying
that the covariations they see are indeed causal; and the use
of same wording can point to the commonalities between an
observed action and agent’s action (as in intervention studies:
“The block makes it go. Can you make it go?”). Indeed, there is
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accumulating evidence that the use of causal framing can impact
children’s propensity to make causal inferences from directly
perceived and indirect evidence (Sobel and Sommerville, 2009;
Bonawitz et al., 2010; Butler and Markman, 2012; Lane and
Shafto, 2017).
One possibility is that verbal framing merely highlights the
problem for children: making the task more sensitive to their
theory construction ability by reducing peripheral demands such
as the need to focus attention (Sobel and Sommerville, 2009).
Another possibility is that without the verbal framing younger
children are yet to develop some of the fundamental cognitive
components needed to construct a causal explanation from
evidence alone. The difficulty with using never-seen-before causal
relationships is that some training or explanation is necessary
for children to have the required background information to
make inferences. While the nature of the instructions have
been varied, they are rarely excluded. The verbal framing may
simplify the task for older children, equally, it may make the test
unsuitable for younger children such as 2–3 year-olds if they lack
sufficient verbal ability to follow the instructions. We therefore
designed a paradigm with minimal language requirements to
explore this issue. We also intended to use this paradigm to make
comparisons between children and non-human primates. This
line of evidence could be very informative in establishing the
degree to which human scientific thinking is grounded in skills
we share with our closest relatives, or is rather a skill that requires
cultural input over development to emerge, and verbal input to
elicit in younger children.
Whether or not our closest relatives, chimpanzees, engage
in causal reasoning is a controversial issue in comparative
psychology. Some authors propose that causal reasoning is
a uniquely human ability; and chimpanzees either learn
associatively or they rely on generalizations based on the
surface appearance of objects alone to solve problems (Penn
and Povinelli, 2007; Penn et al., 2008; Bonawitz et al., 2010).
Limitations in performance in some tasks designed to probe the
causal reasoning abilities of great apes would seem to support this
interpretation (Köhler, 1925; Limongelli et al., 1995; Povinelli,
2000; Call, 2007). In contrast to Penn and Povinelli (2007), Seed
et al. (2011) proposed that non-human great apes can make use
of causal information from events happening around them if the
testing situation does not overload other cognitive resources. It
could be shown that they did not rely solely on the available
sensory information to learn associations. However, it has been
a challenge to decisively distinguish associative learning from
causal reasoning.
One of the most promising ways to resolve this issue has been
to compare how non-human primates (and other animals, such
as corvids and dogs) make inferences about the location of food in
two contexts, either: (a) the evidence is caused by the food or (b)
the evidence co-varies with the presence of food but the relation
is arbitrary (reviewed in Seed and Mayer, 2017; Völter and Call,
2017). Great apes successfully used indirect evidence to locate
food in a number of studies: in the form of auditory cues coming
from shaken cups (Call, 2004), the visible effect of weight (Hanus
and Call, 2008); and visible traces or trails (Völter and Call, 2014).
In the critical comparison conditions, in which the relationship
between a similar cue and the food location was arbitrary rather
than causal, apes did not find the food (for example, if the
experimenter played the recording of the rattling sound over the
baited cup, Call, 2004). Taken together these studies imply that
apes are capable of causal reasoning about unseen causes.
However, the comparability of the arbitrary conditions to the
causal ones were criticized. For example, Penn and Povinelli
(2007) point out that the “recorded sound” control of the shaken
cups study was not identical to the sound the shaken cup made.
They further argued that the results could still be explained
by associative learning if subjects had used the combination of
shaking motion and rattling sound as a discriminative cue for
locating food. Overall, the comparability of the experimental
and control conditions in terms of different feedback (e.g.,
auditory) poses a challenge for distinguishing causal reasoning
from associative learning.
The task presented in this study was designed to address
some of the empirical challenges raised above by reducing verbal
requirements and implementing robust controls for associative
learning. In the “causal condition,” a ball containing a reward
was dropped into a forked tube, and could be found in one of
two cups at the bottom. After the ball was dropped, participants
heard either a ding or a clack sound. After a few trials, subjects
were expected to learn that when they heard a ding, the ball
would be in one cup and when it was a clack, the ball would
be in the other one. If subjects succeed in this condition, it
might mean that they reasoned about the underlying causal
structure (the ball hitting the different boxes caused different
sounds) or that they simply associated the sound with the
side (if ding, choose right). In order to distinguish between
these two possibilities, in the “arbitrary condition” the order
of events was reversed: participants first heard a ding or a
clack sound, and then the ball was dropped into the forked
tube. Although the sounds were still predictive of the location
of the ball (if ding, choose right), the relationship was now
arbitrary. Critically, the two conditions were equivalent from
an associative learning perspective since the stimuli involved in
both conditions were exactly the same and the only difference
was the order of events. However, if participants reason about
unseen causes, they are expected to do better in the “causal
condition” where there is a plausible causal structure than in the
“arbitrary condition.”
In previous studies, we have found such differences between
causal and arbitrary conditions in children between the ages
of 3 and 5, when dealing with directly perceivable events such
as choosing an appropriate tool or an unobstructed path for
extracting a reward (Mayer et al., 2014; Seed and Call, 2014).
However, such performance differences are not apparent in older
children, probably because 6-year olds are capable of interpreting
arbitrary cues as symbolic communication to solve a problem
(DeLoache, 2004; Seed et al., 2011; Mayer et al., 2014). We
therefore focused on the 3–6-year-olds in this study. By 3-years
of age children expect causes to precede their effects (Bullock and
Gelman, 1979; Rankin and McCormack, 2013) so we predicted
that by this age children should perform at above chance levels in
the causal condition if they reasoned causally, and by 6-years they
should be above chance in both conditions.
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EXPERIMENT 1: CHILDREN
Methods
Participants
Three-to-six-year-old children (N = 129) were tested in different
locations in Scotland. There were 65 children in the causal
condition and 64 in the arbitrary condition. Age and sex were
split roughly equally in the two conditions (Table 1). Twenty-
three additional children that were tested were excluded from
the study due to experimenter or apparatus error (7), parental
interference (3), discovery of the trick about the box (4) and
refusal to complete the task (9). All the children studies reported
in this paper were ethically approved by University of St Andrews
Teaching and Research Ethics Committee and informed consent
were taken from parents/guardians.
Materials
Transparent training box
The training apparatus was a forked chute made from clear
acrylic (Figure 1). The middle singular channel (30× 6.5× 5cm)
was forked into two channels. Directly at the bottom of the
channels there were two white acrylic boxes (2.5 cm apart).
The channels were mounted on a white acrylic back panel
(30 × 49 cm); and a base panel (25 × 30 cm) to stand. They
TABLE 1 | Age, sex, and mean/median performances of children in
Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5.
N (females) Mean age Mean/Median
performance
SD
Experiment 1
3-year-olds
Causal 16 (8) 3.6 0.45 0.50
Arbitrary 16 (8) 3.4 0.50 0.50
4-year-olds
Causal 16 (8) 4.5 0.62 0.48
Arbitrary 16 (7) 4.4 0.50 0.50
5-year-olds
Causal 16 (8) 5.4 0.55 0.49
Arbitrary 16 (8) 5.4 0.48 0.50
6-year-olds
Causal 17 (8) 6.4 0.60 0.49
Arbitrary 16 (8) 6.3 0.60 0.49
Experiment 2
4–5-year-olds
Causal 20 (9) 4.7 0.61 0.49
Arbitrary 20 (10) 4.6 0.62 0.49
Experiment 4
3-year-olds 16 (8) 3.5 0.54 0.50
4-year-olds 16 (9) 4.5 0.69 0.46
5-year-olds 16 (8) 5.4 0.83 0.38
Experiment 5
3-year-olds 28 (14) 3.7 0.67 0.47
Numbers in bold represent means that are significantly different from chance
(p < 0.05) according to a Wilcoxon signed rank test (Experiment 1) and one sample
t-tests (Experiments 2, 4, and 5).
FIGURE 1 | Transparent training box (A), opaque testing box (B), and the
back of the opaque testing box (C) used in Experiments 1 and 3.
contained pegs that were 7.5 cm apart from each other on both
sides. The pegs were designed to slow down the fall of the ball
and to make sounds so that subjects could easily follow the ball’s
trajectory. A peg positioned right above the fork could be moved
to the either side from behind the back panel. It enabled the
experimenter to control which side the ball would fall in a trial.
Opaque testing box
The testing apparatus had the same measurements as the training
box but the channels were opaque. The boxes at the bottom
of the channels were spray-painted, one yellow and one gray,
using Plastikote stone-textured paint (Figure 1). In the testing
apparatus, the back panel concealed two additional elements
which, unbeknownst to the participant, controlled the falling
of the ball through the apparatus and the production of the
sound cues.
First, there was a middle singular channel (30 × 10 cm) into
which the dropped ball would fall, hitting pegs along the way,
and land noiselessly on a piece of foam. Below this channel was
a shorter one (6.5 cm) in which a second ball was held and
could be released onto a noise-making block (wooden or metal).
This block could be exchanged by the experimenter depending
on the trial. These two components were combined through
the action of two small motors which controlled the rotation
of small plastic supports that held the two balls in place. When
the motors were switched on by a remote, the plastic supports
would rotate, releasing the two balls according to a precise timing.
The two buttons on the remote controlled the order in which
the motors would activate. In the causal condition, the motor
at the top would operate first and let the ball dropped into
the apparatus by the experimenter, go down the channel hitting
the pegs, and then the motor at the bottom would release the
second ball to fall onto the metal/wooden piece positioned by the
experimenter. The intended illusion was that the ball had fallen
down the channel into one of the two boxes and made a distinct
sound. In the arbitrary condition, the activation of the motors was
reversed. The second support moved first to release the ball on the
metal/wooden piece, and then the experimenter dropped the ball
in time for the first support to rotate and let the ball fall down the
channel with the pegs. The time interval between the activation
of the two motors copied the actual time it would take the ball to
fall in reality and was the same in both conditions. In the causal
condition it appeared as a single event sequence. The electronic
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card that controlled the motors was concealed in a box behind the
apparatus (Figure 1). The reason for creating the illusion rather
than using a real event sequence was that: (1) no local sound cues
were given to locate the ball; and (2) the order of the cues could
be reversed in the arbitrary condition while keeping everything
else about the stimuli exactly the same.
The balls were made of thermoplastic (1.60 cm in diameter)
and contained a hole in the middle where the reward could be put.
Procedure
Training phase
The experiment started with the transparent training box. The
experimenter introduced the task saying; “In this game, I will
put a sticker in the ball and then I will drop the ball from
here (the top opening). It will roll down to one of these boxes
(points to the boxes at the bottom). If you find the ball, you
will win the sticker. Ready?” The experimenter then dropped
the ball and the child could watch the entire trajectory of
the ball until it came to rest, hidden, in one of the boxes.
The child then pointed to or opened the box that she/he
thought the ball was in. Once the child made a choice, the
other box was also opened to show the content. Transparent
training ended after five consecutive successes or ten trials
in total.
Test phase
After the training, the experimenter said “This game was too easy
for you! Shall we make it more fun?” and brought out the opaque
testing box. Then introduced the task to the children; “The game
is the same. I will put a sticker in the ball and drop the ball from
here. If you can find the ball, you will win the sticker. You cannot
see inside the box anymore, but there is still a way to find the
ball in the correct box! Do you want to try?” Before each trial, the
experimenter prepared the apparatus behind a barrier by putting
a ball with a sticker inside into one of the boxes at the bottom,
placing another ball on the support attached to the motor just
above the metal/wood piece and holding another in her hand for
the child to see. The metal and wood pieces were interchanged
in between trials and the remote that controlled the events rested
behind the apparatus.
In the causal condition, the experimenter pressed the causal-
order button on the remote while dropping the ball. From the
participant’s perspective, they would see the experimenter drop
a ball into the apparatus, follow the trajectory of the fall due
to the pegs inside the middle channel and then hear a metallic
or wooden sound.
In the arbitrary condition, the experimenter pressed the
arbitrary-order button on the remote. The participant would first
hear a metallic/wooden sound and then see the experimenter
drop the ball into the apparatus and follow the trajectory of the
fall due to the pegs.
If the child found the ball, the experimenter said “Well done!
You won a sticker!” removed the other box to show that it
was empty and prepared for the next trial. If the child did
not find the ball, the experimenter said “Oh no! It was here
(opening the other box). Let’s do it again!” In total children
got 20 testing trials which lasted about 15 min. For a given
participant the position of the yellow and gray boxes at the
end of the channels stayed the same over the 20 trials (e.g.,
the yellow box on the left was associated with a ding, and the
gray box in the right was associated with a clack), but between
subjects the pairing of the color of the box and the sound
were randomized. The ball was placed in each box 10 times
in a random fashion but never in the same box more than
twice in succession.
Open ended question
At the end of the task, the experimenter asked children; “How
did you decide which box to choose?” If children did not
reply, the experimenter elaborated “Sometimes the ball was in
the gray one and sometimes in the yellow one. How did you
know where the ball was?” Other than 15 missing explanations
(first 10 participants were not asked because it was not initially
planned in the study design and 5 other participants had to leave
immediately after testing), all children responded to the question.
Scoring and Analysis
The first choice of the subjects was scored as their response in all
of the experiments. All trials were scored live by the experimenter
as correct or incorrect and were also videotaped. A second
examiner coded 20% of the videos for reliability, Kappa = 0.97
(95% CI [0.95, 0.99], p < 0.001. The mistakes that were found by
the second coder were corrected and all the videos were recoded
from the video once again to check for other potential mistakes
(none were found). The data for this study can be found at
Supplementary Table S2.
We specified generalized linear mixed models (GLMM;
Baayen, 2008) with binomial error structure and logit link
function using the function glmer of the R-package lme4 (Bates
et al., 2015) for all of our analyses in this paper. In Experiment 1,
our full model comprised of condition (causal/arbitrary), age, and
their interaction; trial number, and sex as fixed effects. Subject
ID and the side of the boxes were included as random effects. In
order to keep type-1 error rates at the nominal level of 5%, we
included random slopes of trial number within subject ID, but
left out the correlation parameters between random intercepts
and random slopes terms (Schielzeth and Forstmeier, 2009; Barr
et al., 2013). We compared the full model to a null model which
included only the random effects using a likelihood ratio test.
The model stability was assessed by excluding individual cases
one at a time and comparing the estimates with those derived
from a model with the full data set. The model was stable with
regards to the fixed effects. We checked whether the variability
was greater than expected (overdispersion) and found that it
was not an issue with regards to the final model (dispersion
parameter: 0.95). Finally, variance inflation factors (VIF) were
calculated using the function vif of the R-package car and it did
not indicate collinearity to be an issue.
The data was not normally distributed so non-parametric
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to examine whether
children’s performance was significantly different from chance
level (p = 0.05) in different conditions and age groups. Children
who chose one side 16 or more times were counted as side biased
according to a two-tailed binomial test (p = 0.004). Chi-square
tests were used to explore the relationship between side bias,
condition and age.
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Children’s responses to the open-ended questions were
categorized into five types of explanations (N = 114) using
the relevant categories from Legare et al. (2010). The first
category, “No explanation,” consisted of children who could/did
not provide a verbal strategy (e.g., pointed to the boxes, said
“yellow/gray one”). The second category was “Don’t know,”
which consisted of children who said they did not know how to
find the ball and they were just guessing. The third category was
“Non-causal strategies” that referred to a solution based on a non-
causal feature or pattern (e.g., the ball alternated right-left-right-
left, “because of the colors”). The fourth category was “Causal
explanations that were wrong” (e.g., “I followed the noises into
the boxes,” “The box wiggled a bit when the ball fell into it”). And
the last category was “Referring to different sounds/materials”
which showed an understanding of the true causal structure
(e.g., “They made two different sounds”). A second examiner
categorized children’s answers into these five different types of
explanations. There was a high agreement between the two
coders, Kappa = 0.86 [95% CI, 0.80, 0.93], p < 0.001 and it rose
to Kappa = 0.96 [95% CI, 0.92, 0.99], p < 0.001 after further
discussions. The disagreements were due to some responses that
could be categorized either as category one or two (e.g., “Don’t
know” and points to the boxes). We decided to include them in
“no explanation” category as they were mostly pointing gestures.
Only when children explicitly stated that they were just guessing,
we included them in “Don’t know” category. The relationship
between verbal explanations, age and condition was explored
using chi-square tests.
Results
Training
All children except for one 5 and three 3-year-olds passed the
transparent training within 5 consecutive trials. Two of these
children needed 6 and the other two needed 8 trials to complete
the transparent training.
Test
The full model comprising of the interaction of age and
condition, sex and trial number as fixed effects fit the data
better than the null model which lacked these fixed effects
[χ2(9) = 30.91, p < 0.001]. We found that there was a significant
condition and age interaction [χ2(3) = 8.71, p < 0.05] and
a significant effect of trial number [χ2(1) = 6.99, p < 0.01].
There was no effect of sex [χ2(1) = 3.17, p = 0.075]
(Supplementary Table S1).
Comparisons of children’s performance in different conditions
across age groups showed that there was no significant difference
between performance in the causal and arbitrary conditions
for 3- and 6-year olds (Mann–Whitney U-Test for 3-year-olds:
U = 93, Ncausal = 16, Narbitrary = 16, p = 0.348; 6-year-olds:
U = 133, Ncausal = 17, Narbitrary = 16, p = 0.921). Three-year-
olds performed at chance level in both causal (Median: 0.45,
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: T+ = 72, N = 15, p = 0.513) and
arbitrary conditions (Median: 0.5, T+ = 40, N = 11, p = 0.562);
6-year-olds were above chance in both causal (Median: 0.6,
T+ = 127, N = 17, p < 0.05) and arbitrary conditions (Median:
0.6, T+ = 92.5, N = 14, p < 0.01). Four-year-olds performed
FIGURE 2 | Performance of children in the causal and arbitrary conditions in
Experiment 1 (N = 129, see Table 1 for age group information and means).
Dotted line shows chance level performance (p = 0.05), error bars represent
SE.
significantly better (U = 64.5, Ncausal = 16, Narbitrary = 16,
p < 0.05) and above chance levels in causal condition (Median:
0.62, T+ = 98.5, N = 14, p < 0.01) as opposed to chance
level performance in arbitrary condition (Median: 0.5, T+ = 39,
N = 12, p = 1). Five-year-olds showed a similar trend for
better performance compared to chance in the causal condition
(Median: 0.55, T+ = 61, N = 12, p = 0.08) than in the arbitrary
condition (Median: 0.48, T+ = 66, N = 15, p = 0.751); however this
difference was not significant (U = 93, Ncausal = 16, Narbitrary = 16,
p = 0.191). Figure 2 shows the average performance of each
age group in causal and arbitrary conditions. An effect of
learning as evidenced by the significant effect of trial number on
performance was found. This was expected given that subjects
had no way of solving the task in their first trial.
There was no significant relationship between condition
and side-bias [χ2(1) = 0.73, p = 0.39], however, there was a
significant relationship between age and side bias [χ2(3) = 16.77,
p < 0.001]. Three-year-olds were more likely to be side biased
than other age groups.
Open Ended Question
Table 2 summarizes the percentages of children’s responses to
the question “How did you decide which box to choose?” in
each age group across two conditions. For a more robust analysis
using chi-square, “no explanation” and “don’t know” categories;
and “non-causal strategies” and “wrong causal explanations”
TABLE 2 | Percentage of children who gave the following explanations in
response to the question "How did you know where the ball was?" in Experiment
1 (N = 114).
Causal condition Arbitrary condition
Explanations 3 yo 4 yo 5 yo 6 yo 3 yo 4 yo 5 yo 6 yo
No idea 90% 58.3% 43% 31% 81% 67% 33% 34%
Wrong idea 10% 8.3% 21% 25% 19% 33% 60% 41%
Correct explanation 0% 33.3% 36% 44% 0% 0% 7% 25%
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categories were lumped to result in three explanation categories
in total: “no idea,” “wrong idea,” and “correct explanation.”
According to the chi-square analysis there was not a significant
relationship between 3-year-old children’s explanations and the
condition they were in [χ2(1) = 0.36, p = 0.55]. In both
conditions, a high percentage of 3-year-olds had “no idea” about
how to find the ball, a minority gave a wrong explanation
and there were no children who could provide the correct
explanation. There was a significant relationship between 4-
year-olds’ explanations and condition [χ2(2) = 6.95, p < 0.05].
Although the majority of 4-year-olds were in the “no idea”
category in both conditions, 33.3% could provide the correct
explanation in the causal condition whereas none did in the
arbitrary condition. Interestingly, there was a higher percentage
of children in the arbitrary condition who gave a “wrong idea”
explanation compared to those in the causal condition. The
relationship between explanations and condition were marginally
significant for 5-year-olds [χ2(2) = 5.73, p = 0.057]. “No idea”
responses were comparable in both conditions, however, there
were more 5-year-olds in the arbitrary condition who referred
to wrong explanations than in causal condition and there
were more children in causal condition that referred to the
“correct explanation” than in the arbitrary condition. There was
a significant relationship between 6-year-olds’ explanations and
the condition they were in [χ2(2) = 6.51, p < 0.05]. The pattern
was similar to 5-year-olds. More children referred to wrong
explanations in the arbitrary condition compared to the causal
condition and more 6-year-olds in the causal condition came
up with an explanation based on different sounds than in the
arbitrary condition.
Finally we explored whether children’s reports matched
with their performance. The performance of the 16 children
who referred to different sounds/materials in the causal
condition was compared with the performance of an age-
matched group in the causal condition who gave other
explanations. The model comprising of the fixed effects of
explanations (correct/incorrect), trial number and sex fit the
data better than the null model without the fixed effects
[χ2(3) = 29.47, p < 0.001] (Supplementary Table S2). There
was a significant effect of explanation type on children’s
performance [χ2(1) = 24.90, p < 0.001]. Children who gave the
correct explanations performed better than their peers who gave
incorrect explanations [Mean difference = 0.25, 95% CI [0.15,
0.36], t(15) = 5.24, p < 0.001]. Moreover, children who gave
correct explanations performed above chance levels [M = 0.77,
95% CI [0.69, 0.85], t(15) = 7.17, p < 0.001], whereas those who
gave incorrect explanations were at chance [M = 0.52, 95% CI
[0.47, 0.56], t(15) = 0.76, p = 0.46].
Discussion
When the sound cues were consistent with a causal structure,
by 4-years of age children used the discriminatory sound cue to
locate the ball, whereas 3-year-olds failed. When the cues were
not consistent with a causal structure, 4–5-year-olds did not use
these same sounds to find the ball; and performed worse than they
did in the causal condition. This difference was significant for
4-year-olds but not for 5-year-olds. These results suggested that
children went beyond the immediately available cues to imagine
their likely unseen causes. The explanations children provided
about how they found the ball matched the results of the main
task. More children referred to different sounds/materials when
there was a plausible causal structure than when the relation
was arbitrary. In addition, the children who referred to different
sounds outperformed their peers who gave different explanations
for their choice.
However, one could argue that the temporal proximity
between the distinct sound cue (metal/wood) and the outcome
(choice of one box) was smaller in the causal condition: when
the order of events was “falling” (filler) sound, metal/wood
sound, choice, than in the arbitrary condition, when the order
was metal/wood sound, filler sound, and then choice. And
since associations are more easily formed between temporally
proximate events (Barnet et al., 1991; Miller and Barnet, 1993),
and even brief delays have been shown to result in a reduction of
causality judgments (Michotte, 1963; Shanks et al., 1989), these
could explain the better performance in the causal condition
compared to the arbitrary condition. In Experiment 2 we tested
this alternative explanation.
Six-year-olds performed equally well in both conditions. Their
successful performance in the arbitrary condition might have
resulted from the ability to treat arbitrary cues as symbols to solve
a problem (DeLoache, 2004; Seed et al., 2011; Mayer et al., 2014).
On the other hand, 3-year-olds did not pass either condition in
this study, they were unable to provide a verbal explanation about
how they found the ball and were more likely to be side-biased.
One possibility for the failure of 3-year-olds could be that
unlike older children, they cannot, or do not spontaneously,
imagine unseen causes. However, other explanations are possible
too, such as the necessity to remember the cues which, being
auditory, are transitory, and map them to one of the two boxes
which do not look to be made of the materials evoked by the
sounds. In Experiment 4 we simplified the task by using boxes
that were visibly made of metal and wood, to examine whether
or not this task would be easier. In Experiment 3, we tested
chimpanzees, and planned to titrate the level of difficulty based
on our initial results with the task described above.
EXPERIMENT 2: FOLLOW-UP WITH
ARBITRARY SOUNDS
In this experiment, we tested whether better performance in
the causal condition as opposed to the arbitrary condition
in Experiment 1 could be due to temporal proximity of the
sound cues and the outcome. Children were asked to locate
a sticker in one of the two boxes based on recorded sounds
which were similar either to the causal (filler, wood/metal) or
the arbitrary order (wood/metal, filler) of the Experiment 1.
Would children perform better when the discriminatory cue
was more proximate to the choice, than when it was followed
by a filler sound? If this was the case, then it would raise
concerns that the differences between the causal and arbitrary
conditions in Experiment 1 could be due to temporal proximity
rather than causal plausibility. However, if children detected the
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causal structure, we did not expect to find differences between
conditions when all cues, regardless of the order, were arbitrarily
related to the outcome.
Methods
Participants
A new group of 40 4–5-year-old children were tested. Half of
them participated in the filler discriminatory condition and the
other half participated in the discriminatory, filler condition. Age
and sex were split roughly equally in the two conditions (Table 1).
Two additional children that were tested were excluded from the
study due to refusal to complete the task.
Materials
The yellow and gray boxes at the bottom of the channels in
Experiment 1 were used. The boxes were covered with lids so that
children could not see inside. A barrier (52 × 31 cm) concealed
the hiding event. Two sounds that lasted about 1 second were
recorded and played back to the children from the experimenter’s
phone. The sounds were amplified with a speaker.
Procedure
Test
The experimenter introduced the task saying; “In this game, I will
hide a sticker in one of these boxes. You won’t see where it goes
but there is a way to find the sticker in the correct box. I will
give you the clue using my phone! If you point to the correct
box, you will win the sticker. Ready?” The experimenter then hid
the sticker behind the barrier. Upon removing the barrier, she
said “Now, pay attention!” and played the recorded sound from
her phone. In the filler, discriminatory condition, the children
heard the filler sound followed by a metal/wood sound at the
end and in the discriminatory, filler condition, they heard the
metal/wood sound followed by the filler sound. The experimenter
asked “Where do you think is the sticker?” and the child pointed
to or opened the box that she/he thought the sticker was in. Once
the child made a choice, the other box was also opened to show
the content.
In total children got 20 trials which lasted about 10 min. The
side of the boxes was randomized across subjects. The sticker was
placed in each box ten times in a random fashion but never in the
same box more than twice in succession.
Open ended question
At the end of the task, the experimenter asked; “How did you
decide which box to choose?” If children did not reply, the
experimenter elaborated “Sometimes the ball was in the gray one
and sometimes in the yellow one. How did you know where the
ball was?” A second examiner categorized children’s answers into
these five different types of explanations, Kappa = 0.92 [95% CI,
0.85, 0.96], p < 0.001.
Scoring and Analysis
A second examiner coded 20% of the videos for reliability,
Kappa = 0.98 [95% CI, 0.97, 0.98], p < 0.001. The full model
consisted of condition, trial number and sex as fixed effects; ID
and the side of the boxes as random effects. We also included
random slopes of trial number within ID, but left out the
correlation parameters between random intercepts and random
slopes terms (Schielzeth and Forstmeier, 2009; Barr et al., 2013).
This full model was compared to a null model which included
only the random effects using a likelihood ratio test.
The model was stable, overdispersion was not an issue with
regards to the full model (dispersion parameter: 0.86) and there
was no multicollinearity. We used one-sample t-tests to examine
performance different from chance level (p = 0.05) in the two
conditions. Finally, the relationship between verbal explanations
and condition was explored using chi-square tests.
Results
Test
The full model was not significantly different from the null model
[χ2(3) = 0.38, p = 0.945]. None of the predictors had a significant
influence on performance (Supplementary Table S3). Children
performed above chance in both the causal [M = 0.61, 95% CI
[0.52, 0.71], t(19) = 2.48, p < 0.05] and the arbitrary sound orders
[M = 0.62, 95% CI [0.53, 0.70], t(19) = 2.87, p < 0.01] (Figure 3).
Open Ended Question
There were 2 missing data points so the analysis was conducted
on data from 38 children. There was not a significant relationship
between children’s explanations and the condition they were in
[χ2(2) = 3.03, p = 0.22]. Overall, there were 13 children who were
in the “no idea” group; 14 children in “wrong explanations” and
11 children who gave the correct explanation. Only the children
who were in the correct explanation group performed above
chance level [t(10) = 7.24, p < 0.001].
Discussion
When the sound cues to locate the reward was completely
arbitrary, the order children heard them did not influence
FIGURE 3 | Performance of children in the causal and arbitrary recorded
sound orders in Experiment 2 (N = 40). Dotted line shows chance level
performance (p = 0.05), error bars represent SE.
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their performance and there was no relationship between their
verbal explanations and the condition they were in. Therefore,
better performance in the causal than the arbitrary condition
in Experiment 1 could not simply be explained based on
the temporal proximity of the sound cue and the outcome
as the associative accounts would suggest. Indeed, Buehner
and May (2002, 2003) have also challenged the necessity of
temporal proximity for causal judgments by showing that it
was the knowledge of the causal structure that influenced
participants’ judgments.
Overall, this experiment provided further evidence to support
our interpretation that by 4-years of age children were able to
use indirect evidence to detect unseen causes based on data
alone. In Experiment 3 we explore chimpanzees’ abilities to
detect unseen causes.
EXPERIMENT 3: CHIMPANZEES
The experiment with chimpanzees consisted of two phases. In
the first phase, we planned to test 6 subjects in the causal
condition as described in Experiment 1. If subjects passed the
causal condition, in the second phase, we planned to test a further
6 chimpanzees on the arbitrary condition. However, if they did
not pass the causal condition, in the second phase we planned
to simplify the task by replacing the yellow and gray boxes at
the bottom with metal and wooden boxes (familiar boxes). With
this manipulation the subjects would receive additional visual
feedback with the conspicuously metal and wooden boxes that
could help them match the sounds and materials more easily.
Methods
Participants
Chimpanzees housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research
Center, Leipzig Zoo (Germany), were selected by convenience
sampling. Six chimpanzees participated in the first phase:
causal condition with unfamiliar boxes. Because none of these
individuals passed the task at above chance levels, in the second
phase, 3 of these experienced chimpanzees and 3 additional naïve
subjects were assigned to the “Familiar boxes, causal condition”
and the other 3 experienced and 3 additional naïve subjects were
assigned to the “Familiar boxes, arbitrary condition.” One subject
in the “familiar boxes arbitrary condition” stopped approaching
the mesh for testing after a few sessions, so she was dropped
from the study, leaving 11 subjects in total who participated in
the second phase (Table 3). Subjects lived in two groups of 6 and
19 individuals and had access to indoor and outdoor enclosures.
They were tested individually in their sleeping rooms and were
not deprived of food or water at any time. Testing days were
consecutive as much as possible. If a subject did not choose to
participate, testing for this individual was canceled for that day.
Research was conducted in accordance with the regulations of the
University of St Andrews’ Animal Welfare and Ethics Committee
(AWEC), Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
and Zoo Leipzig.
TABLE 3 | The name, age, sex, rearing history and information about experiment
participation of chimpanzees (N = 11).
Name Age Sex Rearing history Participation (condition)
Hope 26 f Nursery Unfamiliar (causal), familiar (causal)
Kofi 11 m Mother Unfamiliar (causal), familiar (causal)
Fraukje 41 f Nursery Unfamiliar (causal), familiar (causal)
Bangolo 7 m Mother Familiar (causal)
Sandra 24 f Mother Familiar (causal)
Lobo 13 m Mother Familiar (causal)
Tai 14 f Mother Unfamiliar (causal), familiar (arbitrary)
Dorien 36 f Nursery Unfamiliar (causal), familiar (arbitrary)
Riet 39 f Nursery Unfamiliar (causal), familiar (arbitrary)
Lome 15 m Mother Familiar (Arbitrary)
Frodo 23 m Mother Familiar (arbitrary)
Materials
Transparent training and opaque testing boxes
Exact replicas of the apparatuses described in Experiment 1
were used to test chimpanzees in the unfamiliar boxes causal
condition (Figure 1). The apparatus was placed on a sliding table
(78 × 38 cm) which was fixed to the sides of the mesh panel
(78 × 55 cm). A second opaque screen was placed behind the
mesh panel to block the view of the subject in between trials.
In the second phase with familiar boxes, the yellow and gray
boxes were replaced with boxes of the same size made of wood
and metal (Figure 4).
Sound making training boxes
Chimpanzees in Leipzig Zoo had objects made of different
materials in their outdoor and indoor enclosures (i.e., automatic
metal feeders, tree logs, plastic buckets) and occasionally may
hear the noises they make when they are hit/dropped. However,
in comparison to children we assumed their exposure to
metal and wooden materials would be limited. Therefore, we
prepared two sound-making training boxes: the “metal box”
(6 × 5.5 × 6 cm) made from stainless steel and the “wooden
box” (8 × 7 × 7 cm) made from ply-wood. In both boxes, there
was a thermoplastic ball (1.30 cm in diameter); and there was a
hole (1.25 cm in diameter) on one side of the box. The boxes also
FIGURE 4 | Testing box used in familiar boxes (wooden and metal) conditions
(A) and sound-making training boxes (B) in Experiment 3.
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contained peanuts which could be shaken free, an action which
caused the ball to rattle inside the box and make sounds. The
boxes were passed to the chimpanzees through a movable feeder
that was adjacent to the mesh panel they were tested. A steel
wire passing through each sound-making box secured them to
the steel feeder. Therefore, the subjects could play with the boxes
but could not take them away (Figure 4).
Procedure
Training phase
All subjects completed the transparent training phase before
moving on to the testing. The experimenter placed the
transparent apparatus on the sliding table, put a food reward
(dates, peanuts based on subjects’ preference) in the ball and
when the subject was sitting in front of the mesh, dropped the
ball from the top opening. The subjects were highly motivated
to find the high value food rewards, and were familiar with
the experimental setup where they tried to locate rewards in
cups/boxes/apparatuses. When the experimenter pushed the
sliding table toward the mesh, the subjects could point to one
of the boxes at the bottom. If the subject chose correctly, the
experimenter gave the reward to the subject and took out the
other box to show that it was empty. If the subject pointed to the
wrong box, the experimenter first showed the empty box and then
showed the content of the other box and put the food reward back
into the bucket. If the subject pointed to an irrelevant location or
the choice was ambiguous, the experimenter pulled the sliding
table back, tapped on both boxes at the same time and pushed the
table forward again. When a trial was over, the opaque screen was
put behind the mesh. Chimpanzees received 10 trials per session
and training continued until the subjects selected the correct side
16 out of 20 trials or more (a binomial test was run to calculate
p-value, p = 0.004).
Once a subject passed the transparent training the subjects
also received the sound-making boxes training. The experimenter
put shelled peanuts in full view of the subject into one of the
boxes and passed it to the subject using the steel feeder. When the
subject shook the boxes, the ball hit the walls of the box making
metal/wooden sounds and the peanuts came out through the
hole. Once the subject was done with one box, the experimenter
replaced it with the other box. Half of the subjects got the metal
box first and the wooden second and the other half did the reverse
order. They got sound-making boxes training at the beginning of
each testing session.
Test phase
The unfamiliar boxes causal condition was the same as described
above in Experiment 1. Chimpanzees got 10 trials per session
and testing ended when a subject selected the correct side 16 out
of 20 times or more or until 10 sessions were completed. The
side of the yellow/gray boxes at the end of the channels were
randomized across subjects. The ball was placed in each box 5
times in a random fashion but never in the same box more than
twice in succession.
The procedure for the familiar boxes conditions with wooden
and metal boxes at the bottom were the same as the
unfamiliar boxes.
Scoring and Analysis
A second examiner coded 20% of the videos for reliability,
Kappa = 0.81 [95% CI, 0.75, 0.87], p < 0.001. In the unfamiliar
boxes causal condition the full model comprised of age, sex,
session and trial numbers as fixed effects and ID and the side
of the boxes as random effects. We included random slopes of
trial and session numbers within ID, but left out the correlation
parameters between random intercepts and random slopes terms.
The full and null model comparison was done using a likelihood
ratio test. In order to explore performance in this condition
against chance level (p = 0.05) we used a one-sample t-test. In
the familiar boxes conditions, same analyses methods were used
with the addition of condition (causal/arbitrary) and experience
(experienced/naïve) to fixed effects.
Both models for unfamiliar and familiar boxes were stable and
there were no issues with regards to overdispersion (dispersion
parameter: 1.01 for both), however, multicollinearity was an issue
for the predictors, age and sex. Therefore, sex was removed
from the models.
Results
Unfamiliar Materials
Transparent training
All chimpanzees except for one reached the criterion in
the transparent training within two sessions which was the
minimum amount. This subject needed an extra session to reach
the criterion.
Testing
None of the subjects reached the criterion in the unfamiliar boxes
causal condition; therefore, all subjects received 10 sessions (see
Figure 5). The full model was not significantly different from
the null model [likelihood ratio test: χ2(3) = 1.43, p = 0.698]
(Supplementary Table S4). Furthermore, they were at chance
level overall as a group [M = 0.50, 95% CI [0.45, 0.56], t(5) = 0.15,
p = 0.885]. All individuals except for one were side biased.
Since none of the subjects in unfamiliar boxes condition
passed the task, we moved on to the familiar boxes.
Familiar Materials
Transparent training
Five naïve subjects got the transparent training before moving
on to the testing sessions. They reached the criterion within
two sessions.
Testing
The model including condition, experience level, age, session
and trial numbers was not significantly different from the null
model [χ2(5) = 2.74, p = 0.741]. There was no significant
difference between performances in the causal and arbitrary
conditions nor between the performances of experienced and
naïve individuals (Supplementary Table S5). Subjects in both
conditions performed at chance level; familiar boxes causal
[M = 0.52, 95% CI [0.46, 0.57], t(5) = 0.76, p = 0.480] and
familiar boxes arbitrary [M = 0.53, 95% CI [0.50, 0.56], t(4) = 2.67,
p = 0.06] (Figure 6). One subject reached the criterion in the
causal familiar condition in the last session (M = 0.62, SD = 0.16);
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whereas none of the subjects in the arbitrary condition passed the
task. All individuals except for one in the familiar boxes arbitrary
condition were side biased. There was no significant relationship
between condition and side bias [χ2(1) = 1.32, p = 0.251].
Discussion
Chimpanzees were at chance level in both the causal and arbitrary
conditions and there were no significant differences between
them. Negative results are difficult to interpret, and while the
results, for chimpanzees as for 3-year-olds, could speak to
limitations in spontaneously imagining an unseen cause, there
are other explanations that could account for their failure. For
example, the requirement to integrate knowledge about how
the channels worked (i.e., the ball can land in any one of the
boxes randomly) with the sounds of different materials could
have been challenging. In a recent study, chimpanzees did not
FIGURE 5 | Performance of chimpanzees in the unfamiliar boxes causal
condition across sessions in Experiment 3 Phase 1 (N = 6). Dotted line shows
chance level performance (p = 0.05), error bars represent SE.
FIGURE 6 | Performance of chimpanzees in the familiar boxes causal and
arbitrary conditions in Experiment 3 Phase 2 (N = 11). Dotted line shows
chance level performance (p = 0.05), error bars represent SE.
spontaneously cover the two exits of a similar forked chute,
suggesting that this kind of event might be difficult for them to
anticipate (Suddendorf et al., 2017). Therefore, in Experiment
4, we simplified the task further by removing the channels
completely, and simply requiring subjects to infer where the ball
was based on the sound of one of the boxes being shaken.
EXPERIMENT 4: SHAKEN BOXES
We aimed to see if children and chimpanzees could infer the
location of a food reward in one of two boxes (made of wood
and metal) based on the different sounds made when a ball was
shaken in one of the boxes behind a barrier. We predicted that
4- and 5-year-olds would be able to imagine the cause of the
sound and choose the box made of the corresponding material,
since such an ability would be a pre-requisite for their success in
Experiment 1. Given that 3-year-olds and chimpanzees have been
shown to infer the location of a reward based on the presence or
absence of a sound cue in previous research (Call, 2004; Hill et al.,
2012), we could predict that they would do so here, if they were
able to match the sound made by the different materials to the
appearance of the boxes. We therefore predicted that they would
perform better than they did in Experiments 1 and 3.
Methods
Participants
Eleven chimpanzees (same as in Experiment 3) and a new group
of 48 3–5-year-old children (16 in each age group) participated
in this study (Table 1). Four additional children that were tested
were excluded from the study due to parental interference (2) and
refusal to complete the task (2).
Materials
The metal and wooden boxes from Experiment 3 were used. The
boxes were covered with lids to block subjects’ view. The ball was
made from thermoplastic (1.30 cm in diameter). A barrier was
used to occlude the hiding and shaking events.
Procedure
Children
The experimenter placed the boxes (approximately 15 cm apart
from each other) and the ball on the table and introduced the
task to the children: “In this game I have these two boxes. Now
I will put a sticker in the ball and I will hide the ball in one of
them. If you can find the ball, you will win the sticker!” Then
the experimenter put the barrier in between and hid the ball in a
box and shook it for approximately 5 s; and said “Here is a clue!”
Children could see the arms of the experimenter but not the box
being shaken. Then the experimenter placed the boxes in their
original positions, removed the barrier and asked “Which box do
you want to open?” Children received ten trials. The location of
the boxes were counterbalanced.
At the end of the task, the experimenter asked children how
they found the ball as in Experiment 1.
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Chimpanzees
The procedure was the same for chimpanzees as in children
apart from verbal instructions. Chimpanzees received 10 trials
per session and testing continued until the subjects selected the
correct side 16 out of 20 trials or more or until 10 sessions
were completed.
Scoring and Analysis
A second examiner coded 20% of the videos for reliability,
Kappa = 1.00, p < 0.001 for both children and chimpanzees. The
full model based on the child data comprised of age, sex, and
trial number as fixed effects. The full model of the chimpanzee
data comprised of age, sex, session and trial numbers as fixed
effects. For both models, ID and the side of the box were
the random effects. We included random slopes of trial (and
session numbers for chimpanzees) within ID but left out the
correlation parameters between random intercepts and random
slopes terms. The full and null model comparisons were done
using a likelihood ratio test. In order to explore performance
in this experiment against chance level (p = 0.05) we used one-
sample t-tests.
Both models for children and chimpanzees were stable and
there were no issues with regards to overdispersion (dispersion
parameter for children: 0.71; for chimpanzees: 0.99). There was
no multicollinearity issue for child data; however, age and sex
predictors resulted in collinearity in chimpanzee data. Therefore,
sex was dropped from the model.
Results
Children
The full model was significantly different from the null
model [χ2(4) = 16.62, p < 0.01]. There was a significant
effect of age, [χ2(2) = 15.26, p < 0.001], no effect of sex
[χ2(1) = 0.142, p = 0.706] and no effect of trial number
[χ2(1) = 1.21, p = 0.271] (Supplementary Table S6). The
pairwise comparisons between age groups showed that there was
a significant difference between the performances of 3- and 5-
year-olds (GLMM, user-defined contrasts, z = 3.87, p < 0.001);
no differences between 3- and 4-year-olds (z = 1.89, p = 0.140)
nor between 4 and 5-year-olds (z = 2.17, p = 0.08) (see Table 1
for means). Three-year-olds performed at chance [M = 0.54,
95% CI [0.44, 0.64], t(15) = 0.94, p = 0.362], 4- and 5-year-
olds were significantly above chance; [M = 0.69, 95% CI [0.58,
0.81], t(15) = 3.61, p < 0.01] and [M = 0.83, 95% CI [0.71, 0.95],
t(15) = 5.91, p < 0.001] respectively (Figure 7).
Table 4 summarizes the percentage of children in each age
group based on their responses to the open-ended question.
When the replies were lumped into three explanation categories
as in Experiment 1, there was a significant relationship between
age groups and explanations [χ2(4) = 20.46, p < 0.001]. The
majority of the 3-year-olds were in the “no idea” category (88%)
and only 1 (6%) gave the correct explanation. Among 4-year-
olds, 40% were in the “no idea,” 27% were in the “wrong idea”
categories but 33% of them gave correct explanations. Among 5-
year-olds only 31% were in the no or wrong idea categories and
the majority (60%) were able to provide the correct explanation.
FIGURE 7 | Performance of 3–5-year-olds in shaken boxes in Experiment 4
(N = 48). Dotted line shows chance level performance (p = 0.05), error bars
represent SE.
TABLE 4 | Percentage of children who gave the following explanations in response
to the question "How did you know where the ball was?" in Experiment 4 (N = 48).
Shaken boxes
Explanations 3 yo 4 yo 5 yo
No explanation 88% 40% 13%
Wrong idea 6% 27% 19%
Correct explanation 6% 33% 69%
In order to examine whether children’s reports matched
with their performance, the performance of the 11 children
who referred to different sounds/materials was compared with
the performance of an age-matched group who gave other
explanations. Those who referred to different sounds/materials
performed significantly better (M = 0.93, SE = 0.04) than those
who gave other explanations [M = 0.62, SE = 0.06), t(20) = 4.26,
p < 0.001].
Chimpanzees
The full model for the chimpanzee data did not differ from the
null model [χ2(3) = 2.41, p = 0.492] (Supplementary Table S7).
Chimpanzees performed at chance level [M = 0.50, 95% CI [0.46,
0.53], t(10) = -0.20, p = 0.844] (Figure 8). However, one subject
passed the shaken boxes condition in the 8th session. All but three
individuals were side biased.
Discussion
Three-year-olds and chimpanzees could not infer the location
of the ball based on auditory evidence about the material of a
shaken box. In line with the previous findings from Experiment
1, we found that 4- and 5-year-olds performed significantly above
chance level, corroborating the conclusion that by 4 years of age
children are capable of reasoning about evidence to detect unseen
causes in the absence of linguistic scaffolding.
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FIGURE 8 | Performance of chimpanzees in shaken boxes across sessions in
Experiment 4 (N = 11). Dotted line shows chance level performance
(p = 0.05), error bars represent SE.
In our last experiment we explored whether 3-year-olds’
performance would improve with the addition of causal language
as suggested by previous literature (Bonawitz et al., 2010; Butler
and Markman, 2012; Lane and Shafto, 2017). We used the
shaken boxes paradigm but this time provided cues to the causal
structure of the task verbally.
EXPERIMENT 5: FOLLOW UP WITH
CAUSAL LANGUAGE
Methods
Participants
A new group of 28 3-year-old children participated. There were
equal numbers of boys and girls (Table 1). Three additional
children that were tested were excluded from the study due to
refusal to complete the task (2), and difficulties with language (1).
Materials
Same boxes were used as in Experiment 4.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 4 with the only
exception of the question we asked children to locate the ball.
Instead of “Which box do you want to open?” the experimenter
asked “Which box did I shake?”
A second examiner categorized children’s answers into five
different types of explanations, Kappa = 0.97 [95% CI, 0.94, 0.99],
p < 0.001.
Scoring and Analysis
A second examiner coded 20% of the videos for reliability,
Kappa = 1.00, p < 0.001. In order to see the influence of a
causal question on 3-year-olds’ performance, we merged the data
from Experiment 4 with the current data. Our model consisted
of question type (non-causal as in Experiment 4/causal), trial
number and sex as fixed effects; ID and the side of the boxes as
random effects. We also included random slopes of trial number
within ID, as well as the correlation parameters between random
FIGURE 9 | Performance of 3-year-olds in shaken boxes when they were
asked a non-causal (N = 16, Experiment 4) vs. a causal question (N = 28,
Experiment 5). Dotted line shows chance level performance (p = 0.05), error
bars represent SE.
intercepts and random slopes terms (Schielzeth and Forstmeier,
2009; Barr et al., 2013). The full model was compared to a
null model which included only the random effects using a
likelihood ratio test.
The model was stable with regards to the predictors, there were
no issues with regards to overdispersion (dispersion parameter:
0.85), nor multicollinearity.
We used one-sample t-test to examine whether children’s
performance was significantly different from chance level
(p = 0.05).
Results
The full model was not significantly different from the null model
[χ2(3) = 5.44, p = 0.142] (Supplementary Table S8). However,
we found that 3-year-olds performed significantly above chance
levels in the follow-up [M = 0.67, 95% CI [0.57, 0.76], t(27) = 3.60,
p < 0.01] as opposed to their chance level performance in the
absence of causal language (Figure 9).
The majority of the 3-year-olds were in the “no idea” category
(71%) but 18% gave the correct explanation.
Discussion
Three-year-olds performed significantly above chance levels
when they were asked a question that hinted at the causal
structure of the shaken boxes task as opposed to chance level
performance in Experiment 4. Even though the majority still
could not explain how they found the ball, more children than
in Experiment 1 gave the correct explanation. These findings
showed that 3-year-olds were able to distinguish the auditory
stimuli, and the peripheral demands of remembering what they
heard and matching the sound with the box were not too high.
However, this experiment does not explain how exactly verbal
framing of the task facilitated performance. One possibility is
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that, the causal question boosted their performance through
highlighting the problem; hence, scaffolding their ability to make
inferences. Another possibility is that, by asking a question like
“Which box did I shake?” we simplified the task such that it
reduced the need for children to seek a causal explanation for the
sounds they heard.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We presented 3–6-year-old children and chimpanzees with a
novel, natural causation task where they needed to use indirect
evidence (auditory cues) to locate a reward in the absence of
either a directly-perceivable causation relationship, or a verbal
instruction to look for the cause of an outcome. By 4-years of age,
children were able to make causal inferences based on evidence
alone. Importantly, they only did so in the causally-plausible
condition in which the falling ball could have caused the different
sounds, rather than when the sound cues preceded the dropping
of the ball and therefore bear an arbitrary relationship to its
final location. In Experiment 2, we corroborated these findings
by eliminating a simpler explanation for better performance
in the causal condition than in the arbitrary one. Six-year-
olds performed equally well and above chance levels in both
causal and arbitrary conditions. This was in line with previous
evidence showing that they are able to use arbitrary cues as
meaningful symbols to solve a problem, in addition to detecting
a causal structure from data. On the other hand, 3-year-olds and
chimpanzees failed the task (Experiment 1 and 3). In Experiment
4, when the task was simplified to inferring the location of a
reward in a metal and a wooden box based on the sounds it
made, the performance of younger children and chimpanzees
did not improve. But when the task was framed using causal
language, 3-year-olds performed above chance levels. We discuss
these findings and their implications in turn.
In the absence of causal instruction, 4- and 5-year-old children
were able to use indirect auditory cues to locate a reward when
there was a plausible causal structure to the task. They performed
worse when the cues were arbitrarily related to the location of
the reward. Children’s explanations corroborated these findings:
they referred to different sounds and materials in the causal
condition more than the arbitrary condition and those who
referred to different sounds outperformed their peers who gave
other explanations.
Similar to the 4- and 5- year-olds, 6-year-olds passed the causal
condition, but in contrast to the younger children they performed
equally well in the arbitrary condition. This was as predicted
based on similar findings with this age group in previous studies
(DeLoache, 2004; Mayer et al., 2014). We suspect that older
children solved the task because they interpreted the arbitrary
cues as symbolic. DeLoache refers to this ability as holding dual
representations: representing the symbol as an object/event by
itself and also as a cue that stands for something else. In the
arbitrary condition of our task, the metal and the wooden sounds
that came before the ball was dropped had no causal relevance to
the task, however, they could be treated as symbols that cued the
child to which box the ball would be in since they were always
predictive of the ball’s location. Holding dual representations is
cognitively challenging since one has to ignore the fact that it
is causally irrelevant given the task but it may point to some
information that is useful in order to solve the problem. For
this reason DeLoache (2004) argued that the use of symbolic
knowledge emerges fairly late in development, especially in the
absence of verbal scaffolding.
Three-year-old children and chimpanzees did not
discriminate between the conditions, did not pass either of
them and were more likely to be side biased. This could reflect
a “true negative”: perhaps 3-year-olds and chimpanzees do
not spontaneously make inferences about unseen causes when
dealing with this kind of indirect evidence. Previous research
has shown causal reasoning abilities in 3-year-olds in the context
of direct causal relations and/or with explicit verbal scaffolding
(Gopnik et al., 2001; Sobel et al., 2004; Bonawitz et al., 2010),
but when they were presented with indirect causal structures
such as a block activating a machine at a distance (Kushnir
and Gopnik, 2007) or a task required them to represent prior
knowledge to solve a problem (Sobel et al., 2004), 3-year-olds
performed at chance level. Although suggestive of inferential
reasoning abilities, the studies conducted with chimpanzees
(Call, 2004; Hanus and Call, 2008) were criticized for not
eliminating simpler associative explanations (Penn and Povinelli,
2007) or simplifying the task largely by using food itself as a
cue (Völter and Call, 2014). We found no evidence to suggest
that chimpanzees imagined or reasoned about the unseen causes
involved in this study based on evidence alone. At face value,
these findings may support a number of past claims in the
literature (Penn and Povinelli, 2007): that non-human primates
do not engage in inferential causal reasoning.
However, as with many negative findings, interpreting these
results is not straightforward. One explanation for the failure of
chimpanzees could be that the initial training we implemented
were not sufficient to build the necessary knowledge for solving
the problem. We used the transparent channels and sound-
making boxes training separately to provide them with the
required information for solving the test. One could argue that,
integrating these two pieces of information might have been
challenging. An alternative would be to incorporate these two
together (i.e., tracking the movement of an object based on
two different sounds in a forked apparatus). However, providing
animals with training that is highly similar to the test phase makes
it difficult to rule out associative explanations for success. In
addition, chimpanzees’ failure in Experiment 4 with shaken boxes
despite the repeated experience with wood and metal sound-
making boxes makes us more confident that the lack of prior
experience was not the limiting factor.
Another explanation for the failure of chimpanzees could
be limitations in executive function, specifically attention and
working memory, which could mask or constrain their ability
to reason. All of our tasks required subjects to integrate prior
knowledge about object-object interactions with evidence to
make inferences, and to keep track of transient auditory cues and
match them with two different boxes. Although there is evidence
that chimpanzees are sensitive to different sounds (Slocombe
et al., 2009), capable of cross-modal matching (Davenport et al.,
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1973; Hashiya and Kojima, 2001), and inferring rewards based on
auditory information (Call, 2004), performing all of these tasks at
once may have overloaded their attention and working memory
capacities. In support of this argument, Call (2007) found that;
great apes failed to integrate information about the quality and
the size of the reward when they were trying to locate a desirable
piece of food under one of the two slanted boards although they
were capable of doing these two tasks separately.
On the other hand, 3-year-olds’ failure to succeed cannot
easily be explained based on limitations in executive functions.
It is true that our first experiment might have been challenging
for young preschoolers, as it relied on integrating knowledge
about channels and the sound of different materials that were not
visible. The cognitive control abilities such as attention shifting
and working memory undergo significant changes between the
ages three and four (Frye et al., 1995; Zelazo and Muller, 2002)
and this may influence 3-year-olds’ performance when dealing
with tasks where they need to keep track of multiple pieces of
information. Previous research has shown how task difficulty
may hamper performance of this age group (Hill et al., 2012).
However, when we reduced the task difficulty largely with the
removal of the channels and use of conspicuously metal and
wooden boxes, it did not help 3-year-olds. On the other hand,
they were able to solve the exact same task when causal language
was involved, showing that the demands on executive functions
were not too high. They were able to distinguish the two sounds,
remember them at the time of choice and match them with the
correct box. This brings us to the function of causal language.
How exactly verbal framing facilitates 3-year-olds’
performance remains unclear. One possibility is that 3-year-olds
fundamentally have the same cognitive machinery as 4- and
5-year-olds. Causal instructions/questions only highlight the
problem among other irrelevant stimuli. In Experiment 5, as
opposed to Experiment 4, children no longer needed to imagine
that the boxes were shaken and this was causing the sounds they
heard. This information was provided by the experimenter and
hence they only needed to focus on the evidence to detect the
true cause without imagining unseen actions or object-object
interactions. Their true capacity was brought out by this verbal
scaffold. The second possibility is that, with such causal questions
the task is no longer measuring causal reasoning. From this point
of view, the children were not required to make spontaneous
inferences about evidence anymore but were asked to match a
sound with the correct box. Which of these interpretations better
explain the difference we find between Experiment 4 and 5 is an
open and an interesting question that requires further research.
Overall, children’s explanations about how they found the ball
were in line with their problem-solving performance. First, there
were more children in the causal condition than in the arbitrary
one who said they found the ball based on different sounds it
made in different boxes. Second, these children’s explanations
aligned with their performance: they performed better than those
who referred to other explanations. Third, most of the 3-year-olds
who performed at chance levels in both conditions either could
not provide a verbal explanation or said they did not know how
to find the ball implying that they found the task challenging.
In addition when 3-year-olds’ performance improved in the
last experiment with causal language, this was reflected in their
verbal explanations too: there were more children who gave
correct explanations compared to Experiment 4. However, the
majority still found it difficult, implying that linguistic expression
is still developing. This association between explanation and
problem-solving measures has been found in previous research.
For example when children were prompted to explain what they
observed (i.e., how a toy worked), they explored inconsistent
outcomes and engaged in hypothesis testing strategies (Legare,
2012); and focused more on causal properties than on perceptual
features of the evidence (Legare and Lombrozo, 2014; Walker
et al., 2014). It has been argued that explaining promotes learning
because it requires one to integrate evidence with prior beliefs
(Lombrozo, 2006) and hence placing observations in the context
of a larger and coherent framework (Wellman and Liu, 2007).
Therefore, if some children were engaging in self-explanation
while trying to solve this task, this could explain why they
performed better than their peers. Further work could test this
notion by prompting children to seek an explanation for the
sounds, to see if this improves performance in 4- and 5- year-olds,
which, while above chance, was not by any means at ceiling level.
To conclude, this work contributed to the developmental
and comparative literature by introducing a novel paradigm
that contrasts learning in a causal and an arbitrary context
without the need for verbal instruction. We argue that our
results are in line with previous suggestions that by 4-years
of age, children are able to use evidence to detect unseen
causes. It is possible that this stems from a tendency to seek
causal explanations even in the absence of instruction to do
so. Studies on exploratory play in young children conducted
by Schulz and colleagues provide similar evidence that 4-year-
old children are actively seeking out causal explanations. For
instance, when provided with ambiguous information about how
a toy worked, they spontaneously explored the toy’s function
rather than playing with a new toy as opposed to when the
function was unambiguous (Schulz and Bonawitz, 2007); and
they also conducted informative interventions (Cook et al., 2011).
However, further work is needed to determine the reasons for the
negative results found with younger children and chimpanzees.
One possible avenue for future research will be the use of visual
cues instead of auditory cues with a similar paradigm. This
might improve performance of preschoolers and chimpanzees
by lowering the cognitive load associated with tracking and
remembering transient auditory cues.
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